


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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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For Deanna, and Iris, and Elliot, and Nathaniel

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1

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I

“Causation, explanation, okay. But, the metaphysics of aspect? What’s that?”

Great question! In honor of the Monty Python boys, I’ll start with something completely different. J. L. Austin, in *Sense and Sensibilia*, observed that something can exist without being real, since, for example, toy ducks certainly exist, even though they are not real ducks. This comment was part of Austin’s ordinary-languaging of the word “real,” but it sparked in his mind some thoughts about “exist,” thoughts that, since they weren’t directly relevant to his topic, he confined to a footnote:

“Exist,” of course, is itself extremely tricky. The word is a verb, but it does not describe something that things do all the time, like breathing, only quieter—ticking over, as it were, in a metaphysical sort of way. (Austin 1962, 68)

This “ticking over” bit is one of the great rhetorical moments in twentieth-century philosophy, but its greatness makes it easy to overlook what the footnote is missing. People usually quote Austin approvingly.¹ They agree with his claim. But Austin just asserts it. He doesn’t

¹ An example: (van Inwagen 2009, 477). The temptation to make the mistake Austin opposed starts early. My older son asked me the other day “Do you know what I’m doing?” He was lying on the floor waving his hand in the air. “No, what?” “Existing.”

argue for it. Once you realize this, so many questions are immediately urgent: why, exactly, doesn't "exist" describe something things do? What is it to do something anyway? What does *doing something* contrast with, and what can be said, in general, about which things fall on which side of the line?

I'll answer some of these questions in a minute, but first I want to change the subject one more time. Suppose that I strike a match and it lights, and that the match wouldn't have lit if I hadn't struck it. Now the match also wouldn't have lit if there hadn't been oxygen in the room. But, many want to say—I want to say—that only the striking is a cause of the lighting; the presence of oxygen is instead a "background condition" to the lighting. But then what is the difference between causes and background conditions? What did the striking do, that the presence of oxygen failed to do, that earned the striking the status of a cause? One tempting answer is that causes have to be events. But this answer only has something going for it if the striking of the match is an event and the presence of oxygen is not. Could that be right? This claim is easier to defend if it comes from some systematic theory of events, rather than being just a one-off judgment. So what general criteria could we state for being an event that the striking would satisfy and the presence of oxygen would not?

These two batteries of questions may seem unconnected, but I think that there is a single distinction that can help with both. Perhaps surprisingly, it is a linguistic distinction: the distinction between "stative" and "non-stative" verbs. The right way to draw the "did something"/"didn't do anything" distinction, and the right way to draw the event/non-event distinction, I am going to claim, uses the stative/non-stative distinction. Among other benefits to drawing these distinctions the way I will draw them is that the claims that drove the questions I started with come out true: existing will turn out not to be a way of doing something, and the presence of oxygen not to be an event.

The stative/non-stative distinction belongs to what linguists call the study of lexical aspect. The other two distinctions belong to metaphysics. The claim I will make, that the metaphysical distinctions

“line up” with the aspectual distinction, is, then, a claim about the “metaphysics” of aspect.

II

This book consists of four essays built around three ideas. Two of the ideas are the ideas about the metaphysics of aspect I just mentioned (ideas I haven’t actually stated in any detail yet—I’m about to get to that); the third is an idea about explanation. Each essay builds on the ideas in a different way, so I’ve written them so that they may be read independently. (This does make for some repetition.) My goal in this chapter is to introduce the ideas and the essays.

Before getting any metaphysics out of the stative/non-stative distinction we need more exposure to the distinction itself. Which verbs are stative, and which are non-stative? One test uses the distinction between a progressive clause, like “Jones was singing,” and a non-progressive clause, like “Jones sang” (a distinction belonging to “grammatical” aspect). For the most part, non-stative verbs may appear in the progressive while stative verbs may not. For example “paddle” is non-stative, and may appear in the progressive: “Jones was paddling the boat” is grammatical. “Be” (the “be of predication,” as in “Jones is tall”) on the other hand, is stative, and may not appear in the progressive: “Jones is being tall” is ungrammatical. This test for stativity is not perfect—stative verbs can sometimes appear in the progressive. Fortunately there are other tests, one of which I’ll discuss in a minute.²

² These are tests for when an English verb is stative. The stative/non-stative contrast exists in other languages too. But I don’t know enough to say anything about them. (Sabine Iatridou tells me that the translation of the “be” of predication into some languages can be non-stative, when it bears perfective marking, something it cannot do in English.)

Comrie, in his book *Aspect*, discusses both the progressive/non-progressive and stative/non-stative distinction; he also discusses progressive uses of stative verbs (Comrie 1976, 37–9).

How does the stative/non-stative distinction help with the question of when an event exists? It is easy to give examples of conditions under which there exists an event, harder to produce a principled theory that fits them. If a bomb explodes, then in virtue of this fact an event occurs, namely the explosion of the bomb. By contrast, even though $2 + 2 = 4$, it is false that in virtue of this fact an event (“2 plus 2’s being 4”) occurs. What is the difference between these two cases? More generally, can we say anything useful and informative about which clauses can go in for “S” to make the following true?

If S, then an event occurs in virtue of the fact that S.

I hold that you get a truth from the above schema when you put in for “S” a simple clause whose main verb is non-stative.³

³ The clause must be in the present tense and non-progressive. I also endorse the past tense and the progressive analogues of this schema.

This answer is not mine originally. It is a key plank in the “Neo-Davidsonian” approach to the semantics of natural language. Parsons (1990) defends the approach and discusses its history. It gets its name from some papers by Donald Davidson, collected in (Davidson 2001).

In chapter 5 I end up restricting this claim to exclude non-stative verb phrases headed by raising verbs; since “fail” is a raising verb, with this restriction the theory does not entail that there are “negative events” like failures. See that chapter for my reasons for doing this, and a definition of “raising verb.”

It may be that I should make even more restrictions. When Socrates died Xanthippe became a widow. If “become a widow” is non-stative, then my theory says that there was a corresponding event. But many philosophers have thought that while an event (a death) occurred in virtue of the fact that Socrates died, no event occurred in virtue of the fact that Xanthippe became a widow. I’m inclined to agree. My main reason, which I’ll discuss later, is that I want a theory of events that complements the thesis that events are things that can cause or be caused. “Xanthippe’s becoming a widow” doesn’t seem like it can cause anything, or be caused by anything. Now I’m a bit unsure about whether or not “become a widow” is non-stative, but let’s suppose it is. Then in outline I want to restrict the true instances of “If S, then an event occurs in virtue of the fact that S” to exclude instances in which what goes in for “S” has as its main verb phrase a verb phrase like “become a widow.” The problem, of course, is saying which verb phrases those are. I’m afraid I don’t know how to do this. (One suggestion is that they are verb phrases that

This theory gets the cases right. The verb “explode” is non-stative: “The bomb was exploding” is grammatical. So if a bomb explodes, an event (an explosion) occurs in virtue of this fact, as we want. But the “is” of identity is stative: “2 plus 2 is being 4” is ungrammatical. So no event occurs in virtue of the fact that $2 + 2 = 4$. It also gets the examples that motivate the “cause/background condition” distinction right. The theory entails that an event occurred in virtue of the fact that I struck the match, but no event occurred in virtue of the fact that oxygen was present in the room.

If this theory is right, then it is natural to ask whether there are things whose existence “goes with” the truth of sentences with stative verbs in the way that (according to this theory) the existence of events goes with the truth of sentences with non-stative verbs. I say that there are, namely states. If oxygen is present in a room, then in virtue of this fact a state obtains. States, however, are different from events, in a variety of ways; for one thing, only events can cause or be caused. States cannot.⁴ (These claims come in for more attention in chapter 5.)

For many non-stative verbs—this is a bit of a digression—there is a noun spelled the same as the present-participle form of that verb, a noun that applies to the corresponding event. “Stab” is non-stative, and the noun “stabbing” (as in “three stabbings”) applies to events that happen when something of the form “X stabs Y” is true. So when there is such a noun we can go beyond the bare claim that when “X Ved” is true and V is non-stative then there was a corresponding event;

denote mere changes in something’s relations to other things. But that can’t be right, since—I hold—motion is a mere change in something’s relations to other things, yet when something moves there is a corresponding event.) For the most part examples like this won’t come up, so for the most part I will ignore this problem.

⁴ The word “state” is reminiscent of the phrase “state of affairs,” a phrase many philosophers have used to name one kind of thing or another (I’m not sure whether they’ve always used it to name the same kind of thing). But I’m not using “state” to abbreviate “state of affairs,” so please don’t assume that the properties other philosophers have said states of affairs have are properties I say states have. I realize that this means I say very little about the properties states have. I think I say enough about them for the work I want states to do.

we can say that the event was a Ving. But there is not always such a noun.⁵ Still, I will sometimes pretend that there is when I want to state generalizations about facts statable using non-stative verbs and the events that occur in virtue of them. (I'm about to do this in the next sentence.)

The claim that a Ving is happening whenever something is Ving follows from, but is weaker than, the claim that "X is Ving" means the same as "An event that is a Ving by X is happening." Partisans of "Neo-Davidsonian semantics" endorse something like this stronger thesis: they hold that non-stative verb phrases, and only non-stative verb phrases, are actually (at the level of "logical form") predicates of events (see Parsons 1990). But you don't need to be a Neo-Davidsonian to think that non-stative verbs go with events. You can hold that "Jones is crossing the street" entails that a crossing is happening without meaning "A crossing of the street by Jones is happening." You could be even more cautious and hold that it entails this only in conjunction with the assumption that there are such things as events.

⁵ "Announce," for example, is non-stative, so if Jones announced that Smith had won, a corresponding event occurred. But this event was not "an announcing that Smith had won"—this phrase is not grammatical. (Of course we do have a noun for this kind of event: it was an announcement.)

Huddleston calls nouns that share a shape with a present-participle form of a verb "gerundial nouns" (2002, 81–2). In some cases, the gerundial noun derived from a non-stative verb phrase is a mass noun, not a count noun. "Run" is an example (as is any so-called "activity" verb phrase): it's not right to say that when Jones ran, there was a running by Jones. (Mass nouns cannot take determiners like "a" or "three.") I don't know what to make of the fact that some non-statives correspond to count nouns and some to mass nouns. Presumably events are things that can be counted, so it seems that non-statives that correspond to mass nouns do not "go with" events or with states. Mourelatos (1978) claims that non-statives that correspond to mass nouns go with processes rather than events. I still maintain, however, that the stuff that activity verbs go with is in some way "event-like," and so should be grouped with events and not with states. To save space in the main text, but only for this reason, I'll often write as if the gerundial noun derived from a non-stative is always a count noun.

Okay, I've presented a partial theory of events. It is far from a complete theory. It doesn't say anything about the "identity conditions" of events. If Jones crossed the street slowly, he crossed the street, and since "cross" is non-stative the theory says that there was a slow crossing by Jones, and also a crossing by Jones. But the theory doesn't say anything about whether there was just one crossing, or more. The theory also doesn't say anything about the essences of events. It doesn't say whether Jones' crossing is a crossing in every possible world in which it happens. For all the theory says, the property of being a crossing is a property that event has contingently.⁶

While it is far from complete, the theory does make a substantive claim about the conditions under which an event is occurring. So why believe it? It gets the small number of cases I've looked at right. But so do other theories. So does, for example, the theory that an event happens whenever something changes. When a bomb explodes, the bomb changes, but when $2 + 2 = 4$ nothing changes. Yet these are distinct theories: a non-stative verb phrase can apply to you even if you don't change. "Stand still," for example, is non-stative, but someone who is standing still need not be changing.

Why prefer my theory to the theory that "events are changes"? Some may intuit that the claim

when someone stands still an event occurs in virtue of
this fact

is false. I myself don't share that intuition. More importantly, I am interested in arguments for and against my view that don't rest simply on intuitions about when an event does or does not happen. This is because I want a theory of events with the following two features. First, the line it draws between events and states should be a natural one, a

⁶ Lots of philosophers have weighed in on the identity conditions and essences of events. For just a few references, Bennett seems to hold that when Jones crossed the street then there was just one crossing, which was slow (Bennett 1988), while Yablo holds that there were at least two crossings, both of them slow, one of them essentially slow, the other not (Yablo 2010).

“joint in nature.” Second, the theory should “play well” with the thesis that events can be causes and effects while states cannot. And whether the theory gets intuitions about when an event happens by and large right does not seem to me to bear very directly on whether the theory has either of these features. I say something in defense of the theory’s having these two features in chapters 2 and 5.⁷

I’ve said a lot about events; I need to get back to J. L. Austin, “exists,” and doing something. He said that “exists” does not describe something things do, but left us asking what demarcates doing something from its contrary. Now it will be useful to have an abbreviation for “X did something,” and I will use “X acted” for this purpose. I think this is a perfectly good thing, and a perfectly ordinary thing, to mean by “X acted.” But to forestall confusion I should say that this is not the only meaning “acted” has in philosophy. Some philosophers use “X acted” to mean what I mean by “X acted intentionally” or “X acted for a reason”; if Jones sneezed involuntarily he did not act, in the more demanding sense, but did act, in my less demanding sense, since he did something, namely sneeze.⁸

Okay, now as with the event/non-event contrast it is easy to give examples of the act/non-act contrast. If Jones paddled his canoe, he

⁷ Neo-Davidsonians will argue that the theory I’ve written down follows from their semantic theory, and so any argument for their semantic theory is an argument for the theory I’ve written down. I won’t look a gift horse in the mouth; I’m happy to endorse arguments like that. But I’m not going to be giving any in this book.

⁸ Davidson’s use of “action” in his work (Davidson 2001), and the literature that engages with it, is related to the more demanding sense of “act”: for him, an action is an event that happens when someone acts (that is, does something) intentionally.

It was Kieran Setiya who taught me that action theorists often use “act” to mean “act for reasons,” in (Setiya 2009); in that paper he also emphasizes the importance of recognizing the broader sense of “act,” and the connection between acts and non-stative verbs. (These themes play a role in several of Setiya’s papers; the Introduction to (Setiya 2017) has a summary presentation.) It was reading Setiya’s work that got me thinking about this connection. That thinking led to this book. Kieran: I tip my hat to you.

thereby did something. But if Jones was six feet tall, it is false that he thereby did something. What is the difference?

This question has several readings. On some ambitious readings, it asks for the features that are definitional of doing something, or for the features that are uniquely essential to doing something (in the sense that they are not also all essential to something else). I wish I had answers to these questions, but I don't. I'm going to answer the question on a less ambitious reading, a reading on which it asks: is there some informative generalization that separates acting from not acting? Is there some informative condition that can go on the right-hand side of the following to get a truth?

If X Ved, then in virtue of this fact X did something if and only if...

My answer is that you get a truth if you put "V" is non-stative and in the active voice" on the right:

If X Ved, then in virtue of this fact X did something if and only if "Ved" is a non-stative verb phrase in the active voice.

An argument for this thesis goes like this. The first, and central, premise says that "One thing X did was V" is grammatical iff V is non-stative (and appears in the sentence in its plain form). You can convince yourself of this premise by checking instances. For example, "One thing Jones did was break the window" is grammatical while "One thing Jones did was be tall" is not, and "break" is non-stative while "be tall" is stative. The argument for the right-to-left direction then goes like this: suppose (i) that V is non-stative, (ii) that it occurs in the active voice in "X Ved," and (iii) that it is true that X Ved. Now if "One thing X did was V" is grammatical, then "X Ved" entails it if "Ved" is active.⁹ By (i) this is grammatical. By (ii) and

⁹ For example, "stab" is non-stative, and the active "Jones stabbed Smith" entails "One thing Jones did was stab Smith," but the passive "Smith was stabbed by Jones" does not entail "One thing Smith did was be stabbed by Jones" (in fact this last sentence is not grammatical).

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El hombre, y de la mia se rezela."

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Mas no picamos de la misma suerte:
Yo, si pico á un enfermo, le doy vida;
Tú, picando al más sano, le das muerte".

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—*A Short Introduction of Grammar, generally to be used: Compiled and set forth for the bringing up of all those, that intend to attain to the knowledge of the Latin Tongue.*—*Brevissima Institvtio, seu Ratio Grammatices cognoscendæ, ad omnium puerorum utilitatem perscripta; Quam solam Regia Majestas in omnibus scholis docendam præcipit.*—*Propria Qvæ Maribvs . . . construed. London: Longman, et al., 1811. 3 parts in 1, 12mo (pp. 77, 140, 80 = 290). —Bodl.*

This last edition of 1811 would be the one the lad Borrow used at East Dereham in the autumn of that year.

Loyola, Ignatius (*Romany Rye*, p. 351).—*Vita Ignatii Loiolæ. Antverpiæ, 1587, 8vo, and Romæ, 1590, 8vo.*—*The Life of B. Father*

Ignatius of Loyola (*S.L.*), 1616. 8vo.—*Also in the Flos Sanctorum*, ó Libro de las Vidas de los Santos. Madrid, 1599–1601. 2 vols., fol.

The Life in all these forms is by Pedro de Rivadeneyra.

Mallet.—Northern Antiquities; or, an historical account of the manners, customs, religion and laws, language and literature of the ancient Scandinavians. London: Bonn, 1859. 8vo, pp. 578.

Matchett.—The Norfolk and Norwich Remembrancer and Vade-Mecum; containing . . . a Chronological Retrospect of the most Remarkable Events which have occurred in Norfolk and Norwich from 1701 to 1821 inclusive. Norwich: Matchett & Stevenson, 1822. Sm. 8vo, pp. xxiv, 256.

Moll Flanders (*Lavengro*, p. 194).—The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the famous Moll Flanders, &c., who was born in Newgate, and during a Life of continu'd Variety for Threescore Years, besides her Childhood, was Twelve Year a W (. . .), five times a Wife (. . .), Twelve Year a Thief, Eight Year a Transported Felon in Virginia, at last grew Rich, liv'd Honest, and died a Penitent. Written [by Daniel Defoe] from her own Memorandums [in 1683]. London, 1721. 8vo, pp. vi, 366. First ed.

This is Borrow's "Blessed Mary Flanders"!

Monthly Magazine, The; or, British Register. London: for Sir Richard Phillips & Co., 1822–26, vols. liv.–lx. 8vo.—(*Lavengro*, pp. 186–87.)

Murray (*Lavengro*, p. 139).—See in Sir Walter Scott's *Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border*, Kelso, 1802. 2 vols., 8vo.—"The Song of the Outlaw Murray" (vol. i., pp. 5 and ff.).

Muses' Library (*Romany Rye*, p. 318).—Historical and Poetical Medley; or, Muses' Library, being a choice and faithful Collection of the best English Poetry from the times of Edward the Confessor to the reign of King James 1st, with the lives and characters of the known writers, etc. London, 1738. 8vo.—*Bodl.*

(Newgate).—The New Newgate Calendar; or, Modern Criminal Chronology, comprehending the most remarkable cases between 1796 and 1826. London: Robins & Co., 1826. 3 vols., 8vo. Portrait

—The Chronicles of Crime; or, The New Newgate Calendar. [By Camden Pelham.] London, 1841. 2 vols., 8vo (pp. 1228). Plates.

Newgate Lives and Trials (*Lavengro*, p. 204).—Celebrated Trials and Remarkable Cases of Criminal Jurisprudence, from the earliest records to the year 1825. London: Knight & Lacey, 1825. 6 vols., 8vo. Plates. Compiled and edited by Geo. Borrow.

Olaus Magnus.—De Gentibus Septentrionalibus Historia. Ambergæ, 1599. 18mo.—*Taylor Inst.*

Olaus Wormius.—(Runer) Sive Danica Literatura Antiquissima vulgo Gothica dicta. Luci reddita operâ Olai Wormii, D. M. Hafniæ, anno M.DC.XXXVI. 4to.

—Literatura Runica. Hafniæ, 1651. 4to.

O'Reilly, Edward.—A Chronological Account of nearly four hundred Irish writers, down to 1750, with catalogue of their works. Dublin, 1820. 4to.—"*G. Borrow.*"

Owlenglass (*Lavengro*, p. 225).—Von Vlenspiegel eins bauren sun des lands Braunschweick / wie er sein leben volbracht hat / gar mit seltzamen sachen.—Gedruckt zu Erffurdtd durch Melcher Sachssen ynn der Archen Noe. M.D.XXXij (1533). 4to. A-V in 4s & X 3. Plates.—*Bodl.*

—Wunderliche und seltsame Historie Tillen Eulenspiegels, eines Bauern Sohn, aus dem Lande zu Braunschweig gebürtig. Welche aus Niedersächsischer Sprache ins Hochdeutsche übersetzt, und sehr kurzweilig zu lesen. Aus verlangen sehr vieler guten Freunde aufs neue wieder aufgelegt.—Gedruckt in diesem Jahre. Frankfurth a. d. O., bei Trowitzsch und Sohn. (S.A.). A-K in 8s. 8vo. Plates.—*Borrow's copy.*

—The German Rogue; or, the Life and Merry Adventures, Cheats, Stratagems, and Contrivances of Tiel Eulespiegle. Made English from the High-Dutch. London, 1720. 8vo, ll. 2, pp. 111.—*Bodl.*

Parny (*Romany Rye*, pp. 344, 357).—Guerre des Dieux, anciens et modernes: poëme en dix chants. Seconde édition. Paris: Didot, an vii (1798). 8vo, pp. 204.

Patten, R.—The History of the late Rebellion, with Original Papers and Characters of the principal Noblemen and Gentlemen concern'd in it. By the Rev. Mr. Robert Patten, formerly Chaplain to Mr. Foster. Second edition, with large additions. London, 1717. 8vo.—*Bodl.*

Phillips, Sir Richard (*Lavengro*, p. 205).—The Proximate Causes of Material Phenomena, and the true principles of universal causation considered. Second edition. London, 1821. 8vo.—*Bodl.*

—(*Lavengro*, p. 254.)—Ueber die nächsten Ursachen der materiellen Erscheinungen des Universums. Von Sir Richard Philipps (*sic*). Nach dem Englischen bearbeitet von General v. Theobald und Prof. Dr. Lebret. Stuttgart, 1826. 8vo, pp. xxxii, 429.

—Four Dialogues between an Oxford Tutor and a Disciple of the Common-sense Philosophy, relative to the proximate causes of material phenomena. London, 1824. 8vo.—*Bodl.*

See *Lavengro*: "Oxford" principles (pp. 190, 216), theory (p. 215), politics (p. 228), Oxford-like manner (pp. 215, 216), "Oxford" Review (pp. 190, 215).

Piers Ploughman (*Romany Rye*, p. 315).—The Vision and the Creed of Piers Ploughman. With notes and a glossary by Thomas Wright. London: Pickering, 1842. 2 vols., sm. 8vo.

Pocahontas (*Romany Rye*, p. 352).—The Indian Princess; or, the Story of Pocahontas. By Edward Eggleston and Lillie Eggleston Seelye. London (1880?). 12mo, pp. 310.

—American Statesmen. John Randolph. By Henry Adams. Boston, 1884. 12mo, pp. vi, 313.

Psalmboek, Hebreus en Nederlants, door Leusden. Amsterdam, 1666. 18mo. "*George Borrow ejus liber*, 1821."—(*Lavengro*, pp. 151, 160.)

Pulci (*Lavengro*, p. 497; *Romany Rye*, pp. 69, 316).—Morgante Maggiore di Lvgi Pvlci Firentino, etc. Venetia, 1546. 4to, ll. 4, ff. 199.—*Bodl.*

—Il Morgante Maggiore, di Luigi Pulci. Londra (*Livorno*), 1768. 3 vols., 16mo.

Records of the West Norfolk Militia: *I.* Original Enrollment Book, 1787–1815. *II.* Regimental Order Book, 1812–15. 2 vols., fol.—*Mousehold Barracks, Norwich.*

Richmond, Rev. Legh (*Lavengro*, pp. 189, 197, 202).—The Dairyman's Daughter [*i.e.*, Elizabeth Wallbridge]: An authentic narrative. By a clergyman of the Church of England. London, 1810, 1817, 1819, 1824, etc.

—Annals of the Poor. By the Rev. Legh Richmond, M.A., late Rector of Turvey, Bedfordshire. London: The Religious Tract Society, 1842. 24mo, pp. 240.

1. *The Dairyman's Daughter*, pp. 101.
2. The Negro Servant.
3. The Young Cottager.
4. The Cottage Conversation.
5. A Visit to the Infirmary.

One of the first of the "Evangelicals" (*Romany Rye*, p. 37).

(**Sagas**).—Fornmanna Sögur. Kaupmannahafn, 1825–37. 12 vols., 8vo.—*Bodl.*

"*Bui hin Digri*," vol. x., p. 258.

—Fornaldar Sögur Nordlanda eftir gömlum handritum, utgefnar af C. C. Rafn. Kaupm., 1829–30. 3 vols., 8vo.—"*G. Borrow*."

See also *Snorro* and *Wilkina*.

Saxonis Grammatici Historia Danica. S. J. Stephanus recog. notisque illustravit. Sorae, 1644–45. 2 vols., fol. Plates.—"*G. H. Borrow*."

—Ed. P. E. Müller. Havniæ, 1839–58. 2 vols., roy. 8vo.—*Bodl.*

Smith, Capt. Alex.—A Compleat History of the Lives and Robberies of the most notorious Highwaymen, Footpads, Shoplifts, and Cheats, of both sexes, about London and Great Britain, for above an hundred years past. London, 1719. 12mo.—*Library of G. B.*

Snorro Sturleson (*Lavengro*, pp. 12, 46).—Heims Kringla / eller Snorre Sturlusons Nordländske Konunga Sagor. Sive Historiæ Regum Septentrionalium, à Snorrone Sturlonide, ante secula quinque, patrio sermone antiquo conscriptæ, quas . . . illustravit Iohann Peringskiöld. Stockholmiae, 1697. 2 vols., fol.—*Bodl.*

—Snorre Sturlesons Norske Kongers Sagaer. Oversatte [paa Danske] af Jacob Aal. Christiania, 1838–39. 3 parts in 1, fol.—*Bodl.*

"*Bui hin Digri*," part 1, p. 138.

—Snorre Sturlesøns Norske Kongers Chronica. Vdaat paa Danske / aff H. Peder Claussøn. Kiöbenhavn, 1633. 4to, ll. 12, pp. 858, ll. 11.

"*Bui hin Digri*," p. 136.

"Torstein Midlang hug til Boo tvert ofver Ansictet / oc hog Mundstycket bort med all Hagen. Boo sagde / ugierne skulle de Danske Möer nu kysse mig / om jeg kommer nogen tid hiem igien /

og hand hug til Torstein igien / uden paa siden / og hug hannem i to stycker. Da kom Sigmund Brestesøn / en Færöisk Mand / oc hug baade Hænder aff Boo i Handledit / saa at de fulde met Sverdet ned paa Skibet. Boo stack Armstumpene i baandene paa to kister / som stode ved Borde / fulde aff Guld oc Sölff / som hand röfvit havde / oc raabte hojt / *'For borde / for borde / alle Bois Tienere'* / oc hand störte sig ofver borde met Kisterne. Der efter sprunge mange aff hans mend for borde / oc mange blefve slagne i Skibet / thi ey var det got om Fred at bede."

Spira, Francis (*Romany Rye*, p. 352).—FRANCISCI SPIERÆ, qvi, qvod sv̄sceptam semel Euāgelice ueritatis professionē abnegasset, damnassetq; in horrendam incidit desperationem, HISTORIA, à quatuor summis uiris, summa fide conscripta: cum clariss. uirorum Præfationibus, Cælij S(ecundi) C(urionis), & Io. Caluini, & Petri Pauli Vergerij APOLOGIA, in quibus multa hoc tempore scitu digna grauissimè tractantur. Accessit quoq; Martini Borrhai, de usu, quem Spieræ tum exemplum, tum doctrina afferat, IUDICIUM. 2. Petri 2 (etc.) Basileæ, M.D.L. (1550). 16mo, ll. 7, pp. 191, ll. 4.—*Bodl.*

—A Relation of the Fearful Estate of Francis Spira, in the year 1548. Compiled by Natth. Bacon, Esq. London, 1649. 16mo, pp. 80.—*Bodl.*

Steven, William (*Lavengro*, p. 46).—The History of the High School of Edinburgh. Edinburgh, 1849. 8vo, pp. xx, 367 + 220. Plates.

Taylor, William (*Lavengro*, p. 146).—Historical Survey of German Poetry, interspersed with various translations. London, 1830. 3 vols., 8vo.

—A Memoir of the Life and Writings of the late William Taylor of Norwich, containing his correspondence with Robert Southey. Compiled and edited by J. W. Robberds. London, 1843. 2 vols., 8vo.

"With the Author's Compliments to George Borrow, Esq."

Thurtell, John (*Lavengro*, pp. 157–8, 171; *Romany Rye*, pp. 268–71).—"Observer:" London, 10th January, 1824. With woodcuts.—"Norwich Mercury:" 8th, 15th, 22nd November, 1823; 3rd, 10th, 17th January, 1824.—"Monthly Magazine:" 1st December, 1823, p. 472; 1st February, 1824, p. 92.

—The Trial of John Thurtell and Joseph Hunt, for the Murder of Mr. William Weare, in Gill's Hill Lane, Herts, before Mr. Justice Park, on Tuesday, the 6th, and Wednesday, the 7th January, 1824; with the Prayer, and the Condemned Sermon, that was preached before the unhappy Culprits; also, full particulars of the Execution. Embellished with six engraved views, taken expressly for this edition by Mr. Calvert. London: Hodgson & Co., 1824. 8vo, pp. 91. Plates.

—Pierce Egan's Account of the Trial of John Thurtell and Joseph Hunt; with an Appendix, disclosing some extraordinary facts, exclusively in the possession of the Editor, with Portraits, and many other illustrative Engravings. London: Knight & Lacey, 1824. 8vo, pp. 105. Plates.

—The Fatal Effects of Gambling exemplified in the Murder of Wm. Weare, and the Trial and Fate of John Thurtell, the Murderer, and his Accomplices; with Biographical Sketches of the Parties concerned, etc. London: Thomas Kelly, 1824. 8vo, pp. xxii, 512.

Thurtell, John.—Celebrated Trials, etc. London, 1825. Vol. vi, p. 534. Article by Mr. Borrow.

Till Eulenspiegel (*Lavengro*, p. 225).—See *Owlenglass*.

Vámbéry, Hermann (*Romany Rye*, p. 225).—Der Ursprung der Magyaren. Eine Ethnologische Studie. Leipzig, 1882. 8vo, pp. xii, 587.—*Taylor Inst.*

Villotte, Jacobus (*Lavengro*, p. 175; *Romany Rye*, p. 92).—Dictionarium Novum Latino-Armenium ex præcipuis Armeniæ Linguæ Scriptoribus concinnatum: Accedit Tabula Regum et Patriarcharum utriusque Armeniæ. Romæ, 1714. Thick fol.—*Bodl.*

The Latin-Armenian Dictionary, with a Grammar prefixed, from which Borrow drew the Haïkian words and forms displayed in *Lavengro* and *Romany Rye*, such as *kini*, wine; *hatz*, bread; *dzow*, sea; the verbs *hntal*, *siriel*, etc.

Wace (*Romany Rye*, p. 320).—Le Roman de Rou et des Ducs de Normandie, par Robert Wace, poète normand du xii^e siècle; publié pour la première fois par F. Pluquet. Rouen, 1827. 2 vols., 8vo.

Walker, J. C. (*Lavengro*, p. 233).—Historical Memoirs of the Irish Bards. Dublin, 1786. 4to.—*Bodl.*

Wayland Smith.—A Dissertation on a Tradition of the Middle Ages. From the French of G. B. Depping and Francisque Michel. London, 1847. 12mo, pp. 163.

Mr. Borrow's "Völundr" or "Velint".—*Lavengro*, p. 444.

Webb, Alfred.—Compendium of Irish Biography. Dublin, 1878. 8vo.—*Bodl.*

Weir, George (*Romany Rye*, p. 211).—Historical and Descriptive Sketches of the Town and Soke of Horncastle, in the County of Lincoln, and of several places adjacent. London, 1820. Large 8vo, pp. vi, 119. Plates and Map.

Wells, J. S. (*Lavengro*, p. 169).—The Norwich Minstrel; containing several hundred of the most admired and approved Songs, interspersed with select and original Poetry. Compiled by J. S. Wells. Norwich, 1831. 12mo, pp. iv, 251.

White, Wm.—History, Gazetteer, and Directory of Norfolk, and the City and County of the City of Norwich. Sheffield, 1854. 8vo, pp. 881.

—History, Gazetteer, and Directory of Suffolk, etc. Sheffield, 1844. 8vo, pp. 756.

—Ed. 1855. 8vo, pp. 824.

Wight Wallace (*Lavengro*, p. 63).—The Life and Acts of the most famous and valiant Champion, Syr William Wallace, Knight of Ellerslie: Maintainer of ye Liberty of Schottland. [Written by Blind Harry in the year 1361.] Printed at Edinburgh by Andrew Hart, 1630. 16mo, pp. 341, ll. 2. Black Letter.—*Bodl.*

P. 341, after FINIS:—

“Thus endeth *William Wallace* wight,
Behinde him left not such a Knight
Of worthinesse and deed of hand;
From thraldom thrice he fred this land”.

—The Life and Acts of Sir William Wallace, of Ellerslie. By Henry the Minstrel. (Published from a MS. of 1488 with Notes by Dr. Jamieson.) Edinburgh, 1820. 4to, pp. xx, 444.—*Bodl.*

This rhymed “Story-book of Wight Wallace” is in twelve parts or books.

Wilkina Saga.—Sagan om Didrik af Bern. Efter Svenska Handskrifter utgifven af Gunnar Olof Hyltén-Cavallius. Vol. v. af *Samlingar utgifna af Svenska Fornskrift-Sällskapet*. Stockholm, 1850. 8vo, pp. xlv, 487.—*Bodl.*

Stories of Sigurd (Siegfrid), Gunnar (Gunther), Brynhilda (Brunhilt).

Worm, J.—Forsøg til et Lexicon over Danske, Norske, og Islandske Lærde Mænd. Helsingöer, 1771–84. 3 vols., 8vo.—“G. Borrow.”

Wynn, Ellis (*Lavengro*, pp. 404–5).—Gweledigaethau y Bardd Cwsg: yn Cynnws I. Gweledigaeth Cwrs y Byd. II. Gweledigaeth Angai. III. Gweledigaeth Uffern. Gan Ellis Wynn. Caerfyrddin, 1811. 12mo, pp. 77.

—The Sleeping Bard; or Visions of the World, Death, and Hell. By Elis Wyn. Translated from the Cambrian British by George Borrow. London, 1860. 8vo, pp. vii, 128.

W. I. KNAPP.

HIGH ST., OXFORD,
November, 1899

Printed by Hasell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury.

FOOTNOTES.

[0a] *MS.*, “49”.

[0b] *MS.*, “execrated by every unmanly scoundrel, every sycophantic lacquey, and *every political and religious renegade* in Britain”.

[24] *Cf. L’Inferno*, xxvii., 25.

[42] The apothecary.

[46a] *MS.*, see *Life*, i., 34, *n.*

[46b] *Ibid.*

[284] Tipperary.

[311a] *MS.*, “Canning” (1827).

[311b] Viscount Goderich.

[311c] *MS.*, “Canning” (1827).

[311d] *MS.*, “Canning” (1827).

[312a] *MS.*, “who eventually presented him with a bishopric, had espoused,” etc.

[312b] *MS.*, “He is a small landed proprietor who eats,” etc.

[312c] *MS.*, “the *Despatch*, of course”.

[312d] The Spanish Revolution of ’54–’56, made by O’Donnell.

[313] *MS.* (corrected):—

Un Erajái
Sinába chibando an sermón;
Y lle falta un balichó
Al chindomá de aquel gáo;
Y chanéla que los calés
Lo habían nicobáo;
Y penelá 'l erajái:
"Chaboró!
Guíllate á tu quer,
Y nicobéla la pirí
Que teréla 'l balichó,
Y chibéla andró
Una lima de tun chaborí,
Chaborí,
Una lima de tun chaborí."

See also *Lavo-Lil*, p. 200.

[316a] Canto I, st. 53.

[316b] St. 57.

[318] An obscene oath.

[319] See *Muses' Library*, pp. 86, 87. London, 1738. [Better, the original ed. (1547). See *Notes*.]

[320] Genteel with them seems to be synonymous with Gentile and Gentoo; if so, the manner in which it has been applied for ages ceases to surprise, for genteel is heathenish. Ideas of barbaric pearl and gold, glittering armour, plumes, tortures, blood-shedding, and lust, should always be connected with it. Wace, in his grand Norman poem, calls the Baron Genteel:—

"La furent li gentil Baron," etc.

And he certainly could not have applied the word better than to the strong Norman thief, armed cap-a-pie without one particle of ruth or generosity; for a person to be a pink of gentility, that is heathenism, should have no such feelings; and, indeed, the admirers of gentility seldom or never associate any such feelings with it. It was from the Norman, the worst of all robbers and miscreants, who built strong castles, garrisoned them with devils, and tore out poor wretches' eyes, as the Saxon Chronicle says, that the English got their detestable word genteel. What could ever have made the English such admirers of gentility, it would be difficult to say; for, during three hundred years, they suffered enough by it. Their genteel Norman landlords were their scourgers, their torturers, the plunderers of their homes, the dishonourers of their wives, and the deflowers of their daughters. Perhaps after all, fear is at the root of the English veneration for gentility.

[323] Gentle and gentlemanly may be derived from the same root as genteel; but nothing can be more distinct from the mere genteel, than the ideas which enlightened minds associate with these words. Gentle and gentlemanly mean something kind and genial; genteel, that which is glittering or gaudy. A person can be a gentleman in rags, but nobody can be genteel.

[342] The writer has been checked in print by the Scotch with being a Norfolk man. Surely, surely, these latter times have not been exactly the ones in which it was expedient for Scotchmen to check the children of any county in England with the place of their birth, more especially those who have had the honour of being born in Norfolk—times in which British fleets, commanded by Scotchmen, have returned laden with anything but laurels from foreign shores. It would have been well for Britain had she had the old Norfolk man to despatch to the Baltic or the black Sea, lately, instead of Scotch admirals.

[364] As the present work will come out in the midst of a vehement political contest, people may be led to suppose that the above was written expressly for the time. The writer therefore begs to state

that it was written in the year 1854. He cannot help adding that he is neither Whig, Tory, nor Radical, and cares not a straw what party governs England, provided it is governed well. But he has no hopes of good government from the Whigs. It is true that amongst them there is one very great man, Lord Palmerston, who is indeed the sword and buckler, the chariots and the horses of the party; but it is impossible for his lordship to govern well with such colleagues as he has—colleagues which have been forced upon him by family influence, and who are continually pestering him into measures anything but conducive to the country's honour and interest. If Palmerston would govern well, he must get rid of them; but from that step, with all his courage and all his greatness, he will shrink. Yet how proper and easy a step it would be! He could easily get better, but scarcely worse, associates. They appear to have one object in view and only one—jobbery. It was chiefly owing to a most flagitious piece of jobbery, which one of his lordship's principal colleagues sanctioned and promoted, that his lordship experienced his late parliamentary disasters.

[369] A fact.

[372a] *MS.* "Aberdeen."

[372b] *MS.* "Aberdeen."

[383] Like *Ingilis* in Turkish, for English; *Beritania* (England) in Hawaiian, for Britannia.

[386a] *Zincali*, 1843, second ed., vol. ii., p. 146.*

[386b] "I think I'll go there," p. 301. "He is about to quit his native land on a grand philological expedition," p. 303.

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